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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RIGHTS OF SUCCESSIVE BENEFICIARIES TO
TERMINATE A TRUST
This note is limited to a discussion of the termination of trusts in one
factual situation. Where a trust is created under which the income is payable to
one beneficiary for life and on his death the principal is payable to another, the
question arises as to the rights of either of the successive beneficiaries or any
third person to compel termination of the trust if the entire beneficial interest
becomes vested in him prior to the time fixed for the expiration of the trust
according to the terms of the trust instrument.
Where Settlors Purpose has been Accomplished
In Culbertson's Appeal,' the remainder beneficiaries released their interest
to the life beneficiary, and the court in decreeing termination said,
"It must now be considered a well-settled rule in equity that, al-
though a trust may not have ceased by expiration of time, and althou8 h
all its purposes may not have been accomplished, yet if all the parties
who are or may be interested in the trust property are in existence
and are sui juris, and if they all consent and agree thereto, courts of
equity may decree the determination of the trust and the distribution
of the trust fund among those entitled thereto.. The purpose for which
this fund was left in the hands of the appellee was to protect for the
heirs the corpus of the estate. This was the thing sought to be secured.
That object has been fulfilled."
In Stafford's Estate,2 the remainder beneficiary acquired the interest of the
life beneficiaries, and the court in granting termination stated, inter alia, that
the trust was created to protect the corpus of the estate, pending duration of life
interests, and that the purpose of the trust was accomplished when the remainder
beneficiary acquired the entire beneficial interest. Further, ". . .although the trust
may not have ceased by expiration of time. . . , yet, if all the parties who are or
may be interested in the trust property are in existence and are sui juris, and if
they all consent and agree thereto, courts of equity may decree the determination
of the trust."
In' the above two cases it did not appear that the settlor of the trusts had
any other purpose in creating them than to enable the beneficiaries successively
to enjoy the trust property. Other decisions
s are in accord with the doctrine as-
serted by these cases: that where the only purpose of the trust is to preserve the
corpus of the fund for the person next entitled to receive it, the acquisition by
either the life beneficiary or the remainder beneficiary of the entire beneficial
1. 76 Pa. 145 (1874).
2 258 Pa. 595, 102 A. 222 (1917).
3 Sharpless's Estate, 151 Pa. 214, 25 A. 44 (1892); Owen's Estate, 3 Dist. R. 31 (1894);
Simmons's Estate, 3 D. & C. 323 (1923); Warne's Estate, 27 Dist. R. 428 (1928).
NOTES
interest, whether by purchase or inheritance, gives such beneficiary the right to
have the trust terminated.'
The same result should follow where a third person, not a party to the
original trust agreement, acquires the interests of both the life beneficiary and
the remainder beneficiary. If the purpose of the settlor is merely to preserve the
corpus for the remainder beneficiary, it logically follows that when the entire
beneficial interest is acquired by a third person, the purpose of the trust has been
accomplished, or has become impossible of accomplishment, and no reason re-
mains for the continued existence of the trust. Hence termination should be de-
creed.
Parol Evidence to Show Purpose of the Trust
An interesting question arising from these cases is whether parol evidence
is admissible to show the intent of the settlor in creating a trust for successive
beneficiaires. The Restatement of the Law of Trusts categorically states, ". . .If
. . .the purposes are not expressed in the instrument, extrinsic evidence of the
surrounding circumstances to aid in the construction of the instrument is ad-
missible in order to determine the purpose of the trust."' 5 Further,6 ". . . If a
trust is created for successive beneficiaries, in the absence of circumstances in-
dicating a further purpose, the inference is that the only purpose of the trust
is to give the beneficial interest in the trust property to one beneficiary for a desig-
nated period and to preserve the principal for the other beneficiary..."7 The
rule, then, appears to be that if no purpose is stated in the trust instrument, or
if no purpose appears by parol evidence, and the trust is created for successive
beneficiaries, there is an inference that the only purpose is to protect the interests
of the successive beneficiaries, and the person who acquires the entire beneficial
interest, whether life beneficiary, remainder beneficiary, or some third party, can
compel termination of the trust.
Where Settlor's Purpose Not Accomplished
The cases8 and authorities 9 agree that where there is no ulitmate purpose
of any kind requiring the continuance of the trust and all the beneficiaries are
sui juris and consent, termination will be decreed. It follows that successive bene-
ficiaries, or the one who has acquired the entire beneficial interest, can compel
termination under similar circumstances.1 0 Conversely, where the settlor's purpose
is not merely to give the income to the life beneficiary and preserve the principal
4 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 337, comment f (1935).
5 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 337, comment e (1935); see Van Leer v. Van Leer, 221
Pa. 195, 70 A. 716 (1908).
6 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 337, comment f (1935).
" See Milton H. Miller Estate, 30 North. 385 (1946), which uses the identical language.
8 Kamerly Estate, 348.Pa. 225, 35 A.2d 258 (1944); Bowers* Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29
A.2d 519 (1943); Donnan's Trust Estate, 339 Pa. 43, 13 A.2d 55 (1940); Culbertson's Estate,
76 Pa. 145 (1874); Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, 102 A. 222 (1917); Wood's Estate, 261 Pa.
480, 104 A. 673 (1918).
9 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS 1833 (1939).
10 Note 3, supra.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
for the remainder beneficiary, the one who has acquired the interest of the other
cannot terminate if the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out such
purpose."1 The conflict arises as to when termination of the trust would defeat
a material purpose of the settlor. As noted above, the fact that the settlor has
created a trust for successive beneficiaries indicates only a desire to protect the
corpus of the estate for the remainder beneficiary; therefore, in the absence of
parol evidence establishing a different intent, the trust is subject to termination.
Spendthrift or Similar Provisions
Where the trust is subject to spendthrift provisions, the Pennsylvania courts
have repeatedly held that termination will not be decreed either on the petition
of the successive beneficiaries or on the petition of the who has acquired the
entire beneficial interest, since the protection of the life beneficiary is a material
purpose of the trust and would be defeated by termination.1 2 The cases hold that
a spendthrift trust cannot be terminated either by agreement of the parties,18 by
release,' 4 or by renunciation or refusal to accept. 15
In Moser's Estate,18 where the life beneficiary who had acquired the entire
beneficial interest was refused the right to termniate, the court said,
"The trust is clearly a spendthrift trust. . . ; it was established
for her (the life beneficiary's) 17 protection, the income is payable to
her as long as she lives, and cannot be diverted from that channel dur-
ing her lifetime; it is beyond her power by any action or nonaction to
refease the principal, and she cannot dispose of her equitable interest
as cestui que trust, nor can it be taken from her. . .Since the purposes
of the trust can be accomplished in but one way, namely, by the mainten-
ance of it during ... (her) 18 lifetime. . . , it cannot be said that its object
has been accomplished because the life beneficiary is also the owner of
the remainder and is able to manage her own affairs."
Similarly, in Malatesia's Estate,1 9 where the life beneficiary renounced all his
rights and interest in favor of the remainderrnan, the court, in refusing to terminate
the trust, stated,
11 Grazier's Estate, 301 Pa. 422, 152 A. 390 (1930) ; 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS 1836 (1939).
12 Where life beneficiary acquired the entire beneficial interest: Moore's Estate, 198 Pa.
611 (1901); Moser's Estate, 270 Pa. 217, 113 A. 199 (1921); Hay's Estate, 288 Pa, 348, 135
A. 626 (1927); Cook's Estate, 6 D. & C. 260 (1925); Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.,
310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380 (1933); Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 A. 58 (1924).
Where remainder beneficiary acquired the entire beneficial interest: Malatesta's Estate, 29 Dist.
R. 113 (1920); Price's Estate, 3 D. & C. 463 (1923); Porter's Estate, 21 Dist. R. 330 (1912).
18 Porter's Estate, 21 Dist. R. 330 (1912).
14 Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585, 19 A. 1058 (1890); Moser's Estate, 270 Pa. 217, 113
A. 199 (1921); Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 A. 766 (1936).
15 Kiefaber's Estate, 8 D. & C. 231 (1926).
16 270 Pa. 217, 113 A. 199 (1921).
17 Inserted.
18 Inserted.
19 29 Dist. R. 113 (1920).
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"The very pur ose of a spendthrift trust is to protect the cestui ue
trust, by reason of improvidence, generosity, sympathy, or an) ot er
cause, from depriving himself of the benefit of the income during the
existence of the trust, and it is just as much beyond the power of the
cestui que trust to disclaim his income in advance as to sell or mortgage
or anticipate it. In any case, the testator's purpose is infringed and the
cestui que trust is enabled to take a step to his disadvantage that he may
regret in the future. The law allows a testator to guard against such a
contingency, and he having done so in this casc, his directions must be
sustained."
In this connection is to be noted the Act of April 14, 1931, P. L. 29,
20 P. S. 3251,20 which provided, inter alia, that where under a trust there was
a vested remainder to a charitable organization, and all the beneficiaries agreed,
or where the charitable organization had acquired the interests of all the bene-
ficiaries, the trust could be terminated. It was held21 that the statute did not
apply where the trust was a spendthrift trust.
In Bowers' Trust Estate,2 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for the first
time indicated that a trust with spendthrift provisions may be subject to termina-
tion. The facts, briefly, were these: the settlor created a trust with sole and sep-
arate-use and spendthrift provisions in which she herself was life beneficiary
with remainder over to her son, "it being the intent of the donor herein to pre-
serve the principal or corpus of the said trust estate for the benefit of her son."
The remainder beneficiary later assigned his interest to the settlor-life beneficiary
who petitioned for termination. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower
court, granted termination under the general doctrine that equity will decree
termination if all the parties who are or may be beneficially interested in a trust
are in existence and sui juris, and if there is no ultimate purpose of any kind re-
quiring its continuance, and if all the beneficiaries consent. Mr. Justice Horace
Stern, speaking for the court, went on to say,
"If the purpose of the settlor in establishing the trust has not
been fully accomplished, as, for example, where there is in existence
a spendthrift trust, and if the settlor is deceased and therefore in-
capable of consenting, the trust cannot be terminated even though all
the beneficiaries desire that it should be."
After pointing out that in this case the settlor was living and had consented to,
in fact was petitioning for, termination, the court went on,
"In her deed of trust the settlor stated that it was her intent to
preserve the corpus of the trust estate for the benefit of her son. The
son having now conveyed to her his remainder interest, that intent
has obviously been abandoned. So far as the spendthrift provision of
20 Repealed by Estates Act of 1947, P. L. 100, 20 P. S. 301.1.
21 Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 A. 766 (1936).
22 346 Pa. 85, 29 A.2d 519 (1943).
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the deed is concerned, it never served any effective purpose because
the settlor could not create a valid spendthrift trust in her property
for her own use as against her creditors... The separate-use provision
of the deed is also of no practical value because, since the passage of
the married women's property acts, the property of a married woman
is free, as a matter of law, from the debts and engagements of her
husband. It is therefore clear that there is no purpose to be accom-
plished by the continuance of the trust.. ."
It is readily apparent that the court treated the case as one where the settlor
as sole beneficiary petitions for termination and merely followed the general
rule that termination can be compelled although the purposes of the trust have
not been accomplished, 23 stressing the fact that the sole and separate-use and
spendthrift provisions were ineffective. It is believed that the rule of the Bowers'
case will be limited to cases with similar factual set-ups. It is highly improbable
that the decision will be stretched to cover the cases which are the principal con-
cern of this note, i. e. where the successive beneficiary who has acquired the en-
tire beneficial interest of a trust which is subject to spendthrift or similar pro-
visions petitions for termination. The rule still appears to be that the insertion
of spendthrift provisions in the trust instrument will preclude termination be-
fore the trust has ceased by expiration of time, on the theory that the courts
will preserve, wherever possible, the material purpose of the creator of the trust.
The settlor's purpose would be similarly defeated if a support, discretionary,
sole and separate-use, or postponement of enjoyment trust were subject to ter-
mination at the option of the successive beneficiary who has acquired the in-
terest of the other. The cases24 so hold. Termination is generally refused.
The same result should follow where the interests of the successive bene-
ficiaries have been acquired by a third person. The same reasons are applicable.
Termination should not be decreed where a material purpose of the trust would
be defeated by so doing. In one case, 25 where the beneficiary of a postponement
of enjoyment trust transferred his whole interest to a third person, it was held
that the transferee could not terminate until the expiration of the period fixed
by the terms of the trust.
IWhere Settlor's Purpose is Impractical of Fulfillment
Where the purpose of the trust fails or becomes impossible or impractical
of fulfillment, termination is generally decreed on petition of all parties in in-
terest. This is especially so where the income from a trust created to provide an
adequate livelihood for the beneficiary becomes insufficient to meet the current
needs of the beneficiary because of failing economic conditions. Even the pres-
29 See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 339 (1935).
24 Twining's Appeal, 97 Pa. 36 (1881); Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454
(1889).
25 Will of Hamburger, 185 Wis. 270, 201 N. W. 267, 37 A.L.R. 1413 (1924).
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ence of spendthrift provisions is not sufficient to keep the trust alive in these
cases. 26
The Estates Act of 194727 codifies the pre-existing law in this respect. The
Act provides, "The court having jurisdiction of a trust, regardless of any spend-
thrift or similar provisions therein, in its discretion may terminate such trust in
whole or in part, . . . provided the court after hearing is satisfied that the or-
iginal purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is impractical of fulfill-
ment..." 28
The explanatory comment to this section states, inter alia, that the purpose
of this enactment is to give relief in those cases where the trust fails in its pur-
pose or becomes oppressive or otherwise undesirable, and termination was im-
possible under pre-existing law because of inability to secure the consent of per-
sons unborn, unascertained, or not sti juris. To this extent, the statute changes
prior law in Pennsylvania.
Conclusion
In summary, the following rules can be deduced from the cases:
1. In a trust for successive beneficiaries, if no purpose is stated in the trust
instrument, or if no purpose appears by parol evidence, there is an inference
that the only purpose is to give the beneficial interest in the trust property to
one beneficiary for a designated period and to preserve the corpus for the other
beneficiary. Hence the person who acquires the entire beneficial interest, whether
life beneficiary, remainder beneficiary, or some third party, can compel termin-
ation of the trust.
2. The insertion of spendthrift or similar provisions will preclude termin-
ation before the trust has ceased by expiration of time by either the life bene-
ficiary, the remainder beneficiary, or a third party, on the theory that termination
would defeat a material purpose of the trust.
JOSEPH A. BARLOCK
26 Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 37 D. & C. 324 (1940); Auchu's Estate, 38
D. & C. 33 (1940); Posey's Estate, 52 D. & C. 127 (1945).
27. Act of April 24, 1947, P. L.. 100, 20 P. S. 301.1.
28 § 2, Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 100, 20 P. S. 301.1.
